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Abstract
A further generalization of the stochastic replicator dynamic derived by Fudenberg and Harris [12] is considered.
In particular, a Poissonian integral is introduced to the fitness to simulate the affects of anomalous events. For the
two strategy population, an estimation of the long run behavior of the dynamic is derived. For the population with
many strategies, conditions for stability to pure strict Nash equilibria, extinction of dominated pure strategies,
and recurrence in a neighborhood of an internal evolutionary stable strategy are derived. This extends the results
given by Imhof [17].
Asymptotic stochastic stability; evolutionarily stable strategy; invariant measure; Lyapunov function; Nash equi-
librium; recurrence; jump stochastic differential equation
92D15; 60H10; 60J40; 92D25
1 Introduction
Consider a two-player symmetric game, where aij is the payoff to a player using strategy Si against an opponent em-
ploying strategy Sj , and define A = (aij), as the payoff matrix. We define ∆n =
{
y ∈ Rn : yi > 0 for all i and
∑
yi =
1
}
as the n-dimensional simplex and ∆n as it’s closure. Within a population we assume that every individual is
programmed to play a pure strategy Si. Let ri(t) be the size of the subpopulation that plays strategy Si at time
t, which we denote as the ith subpopulation. Furthermore, define r(t) := (r1(t), . . . , rn(t))
T , R(t) :=
∑
i
ri(t) and
s(t) := (s1(t), . . . , sn(t))
T where si(t) := ri(t)/R(t)
(
the ith subpopulation frequency of the population
)
. When an
agent in the ith subpopulation is randomly matched with another player from the entire population,
(
As(t)
)
i
is the
average payoff for this individual, and we take this to be the fitness of the player. We assume growth is proportional
to fitness:
r˙i(t) = ri(t)
(
As(t)
)
i
,
and hence
s˙i(t) = si(t)
((
As(t)
)
i
− s(t)TAs(t)
)
.
This is the replicator dynamic.
Foster and Young [30] appear to be the first to use a stochastic differential equation to describe replicator
dynamic, which they do by injecting a Brownian term directly into the replicator equation. Considering a biological
perspective, Fudenberg and Harris [12] derived a continuous time stochastic replicator dynamic by first assuming
dri(t) = ri(t)
((
As(t)
)
i
dt+ σidWi(t)
)
,
for σi ∈ R+ and the Wi(t) are pairwise independent standard Wiener processes. Itoˆ’s lemma then yields
dsi(t) =
∑
j 6=i
si(t)sj(t)
[((
As(t)
)
i
− (As(t))
j
)
dt+
(
σ2j sj(t)− σ2i si(t)
)
dt+
(
σidWi(t)− σjdWj(t)
)]
. (1)
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This is known as the stochastic replicator dynamic. The idea behind this model is that randomness comes from
the aggregate shock, or population level interactions, that affects the fitness of each type. The only stationary points
for this dynamic are the vertices of the simplex.
The authors then take assume a two strategy population, which equates s2(t) = 1 − s1(t), and obtain the more
manageable model
ds1(t) = s1(t)
(
1− s1(t)
)[
a12 − a22 + σ22 +
{
a11 − a21 − σ21 + a22 − a12 − σ22
}
s1(t)
]
dt
+ σs1(t)
(
1− s1(t)
)
dW (t).
(2)
This dynamic is now a one-dimensional process in which there are many methods and theorems to utilize in order
to determine the stability of the process, for most games.
Cabrales [9] expanded upon the stochastic replicator dynamic by adding deterministic mutations from both an
economic and biological perspective. Cabrales then showed that strictly dominated strategies, under certain mutation
rates, become extinct. Moreover, for the two strategy case and a different fitness than the linear fitness introduced
earlier, the author showed that the invariant measure is weighted at a different point than the internal evolutionary
stable strategy of the deterministic replicator dynamic.
Imhof [17] considered the Fudenberg and Harris’ model with an arbitrary finite number of subpopulations and
determined conditions for recurrence in a neighborhood of an internal evolutionary stable strategy, stability of pure
strategies that are strict Nash equilibria, and the extinction of dominated pure strategies.
Considering the Stratonovich integral instead of Itoˆ’s integral in the stochastic replicator dynamic, Khasminskii
and Potsepun [19] analyzed this dynamic. Interestingly, the authors determined for the two strategy case that this
type of noise has no affect on the dynamics.
Working with n strategies and a more general model than Imhof [17], Bena¨ım, Hofbauer, and Sandholm [5] give
conditions for permanence and impermanence of the stochastic replicator dynamic, i.e, where a system is permanent
if the boundary of the state space is a repeller and, impermanent is when the system converges to the boundary of
the state space with probability one.
The stochastic replicator dynamic simulates everyday noise very well, however, it only assumes randomness
among interactions subject to aggregate shocks, such as the “weather”. One must account for the affects of random
events that come about suddenly and make an immediate impact. There are many examples of these events, which
include earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic explosions, floods, over hunting, an increase in the level of toxicity in the
environment, etc. We call these type of events anomalies. These are all one-time stochastic events that have an
immediate affect on the fitnesses of the subpopulations and are randomly reoccurring. For a bacterial populace,
antibiotics are considered a rare event [3]. Over fishing may also be considered as an anomaly [7]. However, not all
anomalies have catastrophic impacts [8]. The result of many of these anomalies is bottlenecking, or gene deletion.
Well known examples of bottlenecking through catastrophic events are the northern elephant seal and the cheetah
[22]. Furthermore, there are examples of a sudden increase in population, such as migration or an increase in
nutrients. Runoff from farmland enters the Gulf of Mexico via the Mississippi Delta, and this sudden increase in
nutrients creates an increase algae. This algal population growth is so tremendous it depletes oxygen and creates
dead zones and alters the food-chain, which fittingly may be seen as an instant negative effect to the other sea life
[24].
There are a few authors that have modeled anomalies [4, 14], however, they have considered simple models ana-
lyzing the possibility of extinction. Hanson and Tuckwell [14] consider a Poisson integral to capture the impacts of
the affects, and analyze the possibility of extinction. In this paper, we consider effects that impact each subpopula-
tion’s fitness, and where the affects slowly decrease. To capture this phenomenon, a compensated Poisson integral
is added to the Fudenberg and Harris model, so that the expectation of this perturbation is zero, and a continuous
integrand models the various intensities of each impact of the anomaly. Since the process is no longer continuous, but
right-continuous, many of the methods used to determine the behavior of the process no longer may be applied. The
methods we are able to apply require meticulous and tedious calculations, which are not necessary if the dynamic is
almost surely continuous. This displays the complexity that needs to be considered when modeling the evolution of
a populace. Similar to the stochastic replicator dynamic, the only stationary points are the vertices of the simplex.
In an attempt to characterize the two strategy case, an estimation of the long-run behavior is derived. The
method follows the proof of the theorem that Fudenberg and Harris applied in their analysis [12]. The proof of
this theorem first considers a subinterval of [0, 1] where the initial condition lies, and a second-order differential
equation determines the probabilities of the process first leaving from the right or left endpoint. The subinterval is
then extended to [0, 1]. Unlike the theorem applied, we have an integral-differential equation that determines the
probabilities of the process first leaving through the left or right endpoint of the subinterval [29, 1]. Since the general
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form is very difficult to solve, an estimation to the solution of the integral-differential equation is determined. This
solution is then used to estimate the long-run behavior of the process.
For the case where there are more than two subpopulations, we follow the work of Imhof [17]. Imhof derived
conditions for the recurrence in a neighborhood of an an internal evolutionary stable strategy, stability of pure strict
Nash Equilibria, and the extinction of a dominated strategy. The author’s assumptions for the stochastic replicator
dynamic are assumed and sufficient assumptions for the integrands of the compensated Poisson integral are given.
The conditions for the stability of pure Nash equilibria and extinction of pure dominated strategies are more general
and thus creates situations for either behavior to hold that would otherwise not be possible with just considering the
stochastic replicator dynamic. However, the condition for recurrence in a neighborhood of an internal evolutionary
stable strategy are more strenuous, and hence is more difficult to attain.
Of the previously mentioned models, Cabrales [9] is similar, but not very close to the one developed in this paper.
Cabrales adjusts for deterministic mutations and the model analyzed in this paper adjusts for stochastic impacts
on fitness. Moreover, many of Cabrales’s results are given from the natural premise of letting the mutations rates
go to zero, while the results in this paper assume a constant presence and how close these integrands are to each
other dictate the conditions for various stabilities. Lastly, there appears to be a natural extension of the model
developed in this paper and the results of Bena¨ım, Hofbauer, and Sandholm [5] for the conditions of permanence
and impermanence. However, this is not discussed.
2 Deriving the Extended Stochastic Replicator Dynamic
In the event of an anomaly, the affect to each i-subpopulation has a value of which me monetarily call hi. However,
this value is not always the same. To account for this, we take hi(x) as a function that determines the impact of the
anomaly to the ith-subpopulation when the impact has, say, “strength” x ∈ R, i.e., how much the anomaly affects
the populace as a whole. We call hi(x) the jump function of the i
th subpopulation. We assume this anomaly
happens with a Poisson distribution, say N , with intensity measure ν(·). Hence, the intensity is ν(R), where we
assume ν
(
R
)
< ∞. (If ν(R) = ∞ then it is possible for the anomaly to happen an infinite number of time in a
finite time interval.) For any interval of time, the total impact to the ith-subpopulation is
∫ t
0
∫
R
hi(x)N(ds, dx). To
make sense of this integral, for any B ∈ B
(
R
d\{0}
)
, (the Borel σ-algebra) N(t, B) is Poisson process with intensity
ν(B), where the anomaly has “strength” x ∈ B. The integral accounts for all possibilities on how the anomaly could
affect the dynamic. Since we assumed the affect of the anomaly slow dissipates, we adjust the integral by adding the
deterministic −
∫ t
0
∫
R
hi(x)ν(dx)ds, (ds is the Lebesgue measure), so that, for N˜(ds, dx) := N(ds, dx) − ν(dx)ds,
(the expectation) E
[ ∫ t
0
∫
R
hi(x)N˜(ds, dx)
]
= 0. The net affect is
∫ t
0
ri(s−)
∫
R
hi(x)N˜(ds, dx), where ri(s−) is the
left limit, and the expectation is zero.
Therefore our growth model is
dri(t) = ri(t−)
((
As(t−))
i
dt+ σidWi(t) +
∫
R
hi(x)N˜ (dt, dx)
)
. (3)
Remark 2.1. If we assume that inf
x∈R
{
hi(x)
}
> −1 then ri(t) can be written explicitly as exp
(
Yi(t)
)
where dYi(t) =((
As(t−))
i
− σ
2
i
2
)
dt+σidWi(t) +
∫
R
log
[
1+ hi(x)
]
N˜(dt, dx) +
∫
R
(
log
[
1+ hi(x)
]
− hi(x)
)
ν(dx)dt, which follows
from Itoˆ’s lemma. To ensure existence and uniqueness of the sample paths for this process, assumptions for the jump
functions are given below.
Assumption 2.1. We assume that ν(·) is Borel and ν(R) <∞. Moreover, for all i:
a. hi(x) is bounded;
b. inf
x∈R
{
hi(x)
}
> −1;
c. hi(x) is continuously differentiable.
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Although the assumption about the infimum for each jump functions was presented in the context of technical
reasoning, (guaranteeing that we have exponential growth), it translates very well in population dynamics: if an
anomaly has too large of a detrimental impact on the populace then there is an immense shift to the entire dynamics,
and the current model would inadequately describe the interactions. Furthermore, the assumptions on the measure
ν(·) and the jump functions guarantees that the stochastic differential equation further generated by this perturbation
is unique (see See Sato [25], Bertoin [6], or Applebaum [2] for further information).
In order to develop intuition about the evolution of the population, we take a two subpopulation model for the
rest of this section and in section three. In the latter sections, an arbitrary finite number of subpopulations is taken
into consideration, and conditions for stability near a pure strict Nash equilibria are derived, as well as recurrence
in a neighborhood of an internal evolutionary stable strategy, and extinction of pure dominated strategies.
Applying Itoˆ’s lemma ([13] Theorem 2 Chapter 2 §6, [2]) to s1(t) yields
ds1(t) =
[
s1(t−)s2(t−)
((
As(t−))
1
− (As(t−))
2
+ s2(t−)σ22 − s1(t−)σ21
)
+
∫
R

 s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)(
s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)
)
+
(
s2(t−) + s2(t−)h2(x)
) − s1(t−)
s1(t−) + s2(t−)
−
[
s2(t−)h1(x)s1(t−)− s2(t−)h2(x)s1(t−)
])
ν(dx)
]
dt
+ s1(t−)s2(t−)
(
σ1dW1(t)− σ2dW2(t)
)
+
∫
R

 s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)(
s1(t−) + s1(t−)h1(x)
)
+
(
s2(t−) + s2(t−)h2(x)
) − s1(t−)
s1(t−) + s2(t−)

 N˜(dt, dx).
(4)
Solving for ds2(t) gives us a similar equality. This particular version of Itoˆ’s lemma can be found in Applebaum
(Theorem 4.4.7 [2]) or Gihman and Skorohod ([13] Part II Chapter 2 §6). Similar to the stochastic replicator dynamic,
the only stationary points for this dynamic are the vertices of the simplex, which is the case when the population
consists of only one type.
Proposition 2.1. For all finite t ≥ 0 and y ∈ ∆n, we have Py
(
s(t) ∈ ∆n
)
= 1.
This proposition may be readily seen by considering Remark 2.1, which tells us that ri(t) is almost surely positive
for all time, which implies si(t) is in the simplex for any finite time t.
By the proposition we have the equality s2(t) = 1− s1(t). Hence, we may just focus on the dynamics of
ds1(t) = s1(t−)
(
1− s1(t−)
)[
a12 − a22 + σ22 +
∫
R
(
h1(x) − h2(x)
s1(t−)
[
h1(x) − h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
+ h2(x)− h1(x)
)
ν(dx)
+
(
a11 − a21 − σ21 + a22 − a12 − σ22
)
s1(t−)
]
dt
+ σs1(t−)
(
1− s1(t−)
)
dW (t)
+
∫
R
s1(t−)
(
1− s1(t−)
)[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
s1(t−)
[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
N˜(dt, dx),
(5)
where σ :=
√
σ21 + σ
2
2 and W (t) :=
σ1W1(t)− σ2W2(t)
σ
.
If h1(x) = h2(x) for every x ∈ R then the jump terms disappear. Recall that for A˜ :=
(
a11 + c a12
a21 + c a22
)
or
A˜ :=
(
a11 a12 + c
a21 a22 + c
)
, we have the equality
(
A˜p
)
i
− p · A˜p = (Ap)i − p · Ap for i = 1, 2 [16]. Thus, how close
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the jump functions for each subpopulation are to each other, and not how large the size of the jumps are, would
determine how much the system is affected by the Poissonian term. In application, if an anomaly were to affect the
environment in such a way that the subpopulations are equally impacted, an equal change in each respective fitness
is to be expected.
3 An Estimation of the Long Run Behavior for the 2× 2 Case
In this section we estimate the long run behavior for a two strategy population, considering a certain class of jump
functions. Since s2(t) = 1 − s1(t), the analysis is simplified by only considering the dynamics of s1(t) with respect
to Equation (5). Notice for
α˜(y) =: y(1− y)
[(
a12 − a22 + σ22 +
∫
R
(
h2(x) − h1(x)
)
ν(dx)
)
+
((
a11 − a21 − σ21
)
+
(
a22 − a12 − σ22
))
y
]
,
β˜(y) :=
σ2
2
y2
(
1− y)2,
and
y + γ(y, x) := y +
y
(
1− y)[h1(x)− h2(x)]
y
[
h1(x)− h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
=
y
[
1 + h1(x)
]
y
[
h1(x) − h2(x)
]
+ 1 + h2(x)
,
and taking L as the infinitesimal generator of s1(t), we have
Lf(·) = α˜(·)f ′(·) + β˜(·)f ′′(·) +
∫
R
(
f
(
·+γ(·, x)
)
− f(·)
)
ν(dx),
(Theorem 2 Part II Chapter 2 §9 [13]). Now, for 0 < y1 < y2 < 1, define τy1y2(y0) = inf
t≥0
{
s1(t) 6∈ (y1, y2)
∣∣∣s1(0) = y0},
πy2;y1(y0) = P
(
s1
(
τy1y2(y0)
) ≥ y2), and πy1;y2(y0) = P(s1(τy1y2(y0)) ≤ y1). Considering an integro-differential
equation of the form
Lu
(
y
)
= α˜(y)u′(y) + β˜(y)u′′(y) +
∫
R
[
u
(
y + γ(y, x)
)
− u(y)
]
ν(dx) = 0 for y ∈ (y1, y2), (6)
with the conditions u(y) = 0 for y ∈ [0, y1], and u(y) = 1 for y ∈ [y2, 1], the papers of Henry Tuckwell [29] and
Mario Abundo [1] tell us that solving this integro-differential equation will give us πy2;y1(y0),
(
interchanging the
initial conditions will give πy1;y2(y0)
)
. However, in order to apply these theorems we need to verify the condition
E
[
τny1y2(y0)
]
<∞ for every n ∈ Z+. This property is shown in Theorem 4.1 and Remark 4.1.
We should note here that the result in Tuckwell [29] is for a jump-diffusion with a Poisson measure and not the
compensated Poisson measure. However, Tuckwell’s proof is based on a result in Gihman and Skorohod [13], in
which the authors give an equality for the transition probability for a jump-diffusion with a compensated Poisson
measure
(
Part II Chapter 2 §9
)
. Adjusting the first order coefficient by adding the integral with respect to the
Le´vy measure and proceeding similarly will give the equivalent conclusions.
Solving this integro-differential equation is a very difficult task and so we construct a way to approximate the
solution. First we assume that h1(x) = h2(x)+ ǫ, for a small ǫ ∈ R. This assumption tells us that one subpopulation
fairs a little better than the other. Next we turn the difference in the integral into a Taylor series, using ǫ as the
variable, grouping the higher order terms into an error term. Note that we use the function f , instead of u given in
Equation (6), to find the solution. Normalizing f and considering the initial conditions will determine u.
To be rigorous, we determine an appropriate function space for f . Given 0 < y1 < y2 < 1, define y˜1 =
min
x∈R,y∈(y1,y2)
{
y1, y+ γ
(
y, x
)}
and y˜2 = max
x∈R,y∈(y1,y2)
{
y2, y+ γ
(
y, x
)}
. Notice that 0 < y˜1 < y˜2 < 1 since y+ γ
(
y, x
)
= 0
if and only if y = 0, and y+ γ
(
y, x
)
= 1 if and only if y = 1, which further emphasizes Proposition 2.1. Define Cy1y2
as the space of bounded continuous functions that map [y˜1, y˜2] to R, and take f ∈
{
g ∈ Cy1y2 : g′ ∈ Cy1y2 and g′′ ∈
Cy1y2
}
.
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By the assumption that h1(x) = h2(x) + ǫ, we write the integral as a function of ǫ,
F (ǫ) :=
∫
R
[
f
(
y[1 + h2(x) + ǫ]
ǫy + 1 + h2(x)
)
− f(y)
]
ν(dx).
We now approximate F (ǫ) by a Taylor’s series around ǫ = 0. Notice that F (0) = 0,
F ′(0) =
∫
R
f ′
(
y
[
1 + h2(x) + ǫ
]
ǫy + 1 + h2(x)
)(
y
[
1 + h2(x) + ǫ
]
ǫy + 1 + h2(x)
)′
ν(dx)
∣∣∣∣
ǫ=0
=
∫
R
f ′
(
y
[
1 + h2(x) + ǫ
]
ǫy + 1 + h2(x)
)(
y
(
1− y)[1 + h2(x)](
ǫy + 1 + h2(x)
)2
)
ν(dx)
∣∣∣∣
ǫ=0
= y
(
1− y)f ′(y)∫
R
1
1 + h2(x)
ν(dx) := C1y
(
1− y)f ′(y),
and
F ′′(0) =
∫
R

f
′′
(
y
[
1 + h2(x) + ǫ
]
ǫy + 1 + h2(x)
)(
y
(
1− y)[1 + h2(x)](
ǫy + 1 + h2(x)
)2
)2
+ f ′
(
y
[
1 + h2(x) + ǫ
]
ǫy + 1 + h2(x)
)(
−2y2(1− y)[1 + h2(x)](
ǫy + 1 + h2(x)
)3
)
ν(dx)
∣∣∣∣
ǫ=0
= −2y2(1− y)f ′(y)∫
R
1[
1 + h2(x)
]2 ν(dx) + y2(1− y)2f ′′(y)
∫
R
1[
1 + h2(x)
]2 ν(dx)
:= −2C2y2
(
1− y)f ′(y) + C2y2(1− y)2f ′′(y),
where C1 :=
∫
R
1
1 + h2(x)
ν(dx) and C2 :=
∫
R
1[
1 + h2(x)
]2 ν(dx). Thus F (ǫ) = C1y(1 − y)f ′(y)ǫ + ( − 2C2y2(1 −
y
)
f ′(y)+C2y
2
(
1− y)2f ′′(y))ǫ2/2+O(ǫ3). Excluding the error term, Equation (6) becomes the ordinary differential
equation
α˜ǫ(y)f
′(y) + β˜ǫ(y)f
′′(y) = 0, (7)
where
α˜ǫ(y) := y
(
1− y)[(a12 − a22 + σ22 + ǫ(C1 − ν(R))
)
+
{(
a11 − a21 − σ21
)
+
(
a22 − a12 − σ22
)− ǫ2C2}y
]
and
β˜ǫ(y) :=
(
σ2
2
+
ǫ2
2
C2
)
y2
(
1− y)2.
Remark 3.1. Without the quadratic term in our estimation, we would have β˜ǫ(y) =
(
σ2
2
)
y2
(
1 − y)2, and if
σ1 = σ2 = 0 then β˜ǫ(y) ≡ 0. Hence, the quadratic term is included to insure that β˜ǫ(y) > 0 for all y ∈ (0, 1).
The infinitesimal generator, Lǫv(y) := α˜ǫ(y)v
′(y)+ β˜ǫ(y)v
′′(y), where ǫ is fixed, generates a continuous stochastic
differential equation. We call this “new” process sˆ1(t). One may see that the points zero and one are fixed points for
sˆ1(t), and that sˆ1(t) is an estimate to the evolution of Equation (5). The following theorem characterizes the long
run behavior of sˆ1(t), which in turn estimates the behavior of Equation (5).
Theorem 3.1. Take sˆ1(t) in the remark above, A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
, σ2i the variance of the i
th subpopulation, C1
and C2 defined above, and y0 = (y0, y
′
0) ∈ ∆2.
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(i) If a11 − a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
ǫ2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
)) − ǫ2
2
C2, then
Py0
(
lim
t→∞
sˆ1(t) = 0
)
= 1.
(ii) If a11 − a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
ǫ2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
)) − ǫ2
2
C2, then
Py0
(
lim sup
t→∞
sˆ1(t) = 1
)
= Py0
(
lim inf
t→∞
sˆ1(t) = 0
)
= 1.
(iii) If a11 − a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
ǫ2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
)) − ǫ2
2
C2, then
Py0
(
lim
t→∞
sˆ1(t) = 1
)
= 1.
(iv) If a11 − a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
ǫ2
2
C2 and a22 − a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
)) − ǫ2
2
C2, then
Py0
(
lim
t→∞
sˆ1(t) = 0
)
=
f(1)− f(y0)
f(1)− f(0) and Py0
(
lim
t→∞
sˆ1(t) = 1
)
=
f(y0)− f(0)
f(1)− f(0) .
Proof. Using an integrating factor, the function f in Equation (7) may be written as
f ′(y) = k1 exp
{
−
∫ y
y0
α˜ǫ(z)
β˜ǫ(z)
dz
}
,
for some constant k1 and y0 ∈ (y1, y2). The constants in the integral of the exponent are a bit unwieldy, so we define
Nǫ = a12 − a22 + σ22 + ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
and Mǫ =
(
a11 − a21 − σ21
)
+
(
a22 − a12 − σ22
)− ǫ2C2. Simplifying the integral
yields
−
∫ y
y0
α˜ǫ(z)
β˜ǫ(z)
dz = −
(
σ2
2
+
ǫ2
2
C2
)−1 ∫ y
y0
Nǫ +Mǫz
z(1− z) dz
= −
(
σ2
2
+
ǫ2
2
C2
)−1 ∫ y
y0
Nǫ +Mǫ
(1− z) +
Nǫ
z
dz
= log

(y/y0)−
(
σ2
2
+ ǫ
2
2
C2
)
−1
Nǫ
((
1− y
)/(
1− y0
))( σ22 + ǫ22 C2)−1(Nǫ+Mǫ) .
(8)
For some constant k2 we have f(y) = k1
∫ y
y0
z−Nˆ
(
1 − z)Mˆdz − k2, where Mˆ :=
(
σ2
2
+
ǫ2
2
C2
)−1
(Nǫ +Mǫ), Nˆ :=(
σ2
2
+
ǫ2
2
C2
)−1
Nǫ, with the added assumption Nˆ 6= 1.
For u(y) :=
f(y)− f(y1)
f(y2)− f(y1) , f(y) = f(y1) for y ∈ [0, y1], and f(y) = f(y2) for y ∈ [y2, 1], we see that α˜ǫ(y)u
′(y) +
β˜(y)u′′(y) = 0 for y ∈ (y1, y2), u(y) = 0 for y ∈ [0, y1], and u(y) = 1 for y ∈ [y2, 1].
To determine when f(y) will either explode or be finite when y approaches 0 or 1, we derive condition for Nˆ ≷ −1
and Mˆ ≷ −1. For the case when y → 0, we notice that
Nˆ = −
(
σ2
2
+
ǫ2
2
C2
)−1
Nǫ > −1 ⇐⇒ a22 − a12 − σ22 − ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
> −σ2/2− ǫ
2
2
C2
⇐⇒ a22 − a12 > σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))− ǫ2
2
C2
and
Nˆ = −
(
σ2
2
+
ǫ2
2
C2
)−1
Nǫ < −1 ⇐⇒ a22 − a12 < σ
2
2 − σ21
2
+ ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))− ǫ2
2
C2.
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And when y → 1, we see that
Mˆ =
(
σ2
2
+
ǫ2
2
C2
)−1
(Nǫ +Mǫ) > −1 ⇐⇒ a11 − a21 − σ21 + ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))− ǫ2C2 > −σ2/2− ǫ2
2
C2
⇐⇒ a11 − a21 > σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
ǫ2
2
C2.
and
Mˆ =
(
σ2
2
+
ǫ2
2
C2
)−1
(Nǫ +Mǫ) < −1 ⇐⇒ a11 − a21 < σ
2
1 − σ22
2
− ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
ǫ2
2
C2.
Considering each inequality above, Theorem 1 on page 119 (Part1 §16) in Gihman and Skorohod [13] gives us
the rest.
The results in this theorem are very similar to the results found by Fudenberg and Harris [12], with the added
or subtracted piece ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))− ǫ2
2
C2. We first note that the term − ǫ
2
2
C2 lessens the affect that ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
brings to the dynamics. To see how this term could affect the dynamic, suppose that h2(x) < 0 for a significant
amount of x ∈ R so that the inequality C1 > ν
(
R
)
holds, and if ǫ > 0, i.e., the 1st subpopulation favors better, then
ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))− ǫ2
2
C2 could make (1, 0) stochastically stable. To illustrate this scenario, consider when a11 − a21 <
σ21 − σ22
2
. If ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
)) − ǫ2
2
C2 >
∣∣∣∣σ21 − σ222 − (a11 − a21)
∣∣∣∣ then a11 − a21 > σ21 − σ222 − ǫ
(
C1 − ν
(
R
))
+
ǫ2
2
C2,
which negates the behavior of the stochastic replicator dynamic.
Interestingly, if h2(x) > 0 for a sufficient amount of x ∈ R so that C1 < ν
(
R
)
holds, then the term ǫ
(
C1 −
ν
(
R
)) − ǫ2
2
C2 will be negligible. Since there is no negative impact on either subpopulation, (or at least enough to
be significant),this is what one would expect.
4 Strict Nash and Stochastic Stability in the Presence of Continuous
and Instantaneous Random Perturbations
For the case with many subpopulations, Imhof [17] exhibited many useful methods to help determine the long-run
behavior of the stochastic replicator dynamic, which helped the author answer crucial questions in evolutionary game
theory. The rest of the paper is devoted to answering the questions that were posed by Imhof. Although some of
Imhof’s methods are applicable, since the extended stochastic replicator dynamic is right-continuous, a nontrivial
extension of these methods is needed.
Take {e1, e2, . . . , en} as the standard basis of Rn. For the Euclidean norm denoted as | · |, define Uδ(y′) := {y ∈
∆n : |y′ − y| < δ}, and for a Borel set G, τG := inf{t > 0 : s(t) ∈ G}. For the general n subpopulation model, si(t)
has the form
dsi(t) = si(t−)

(As(t−))
i
−
∑
j
sj(t−)
(
As(t−))
j
+
∑
j
sj(t−)σ2j − si(t−)σ2i
+
∫
R

 1 + hi(x)
1 +
∑
j sj(t−)hj(x)
− 1 +
∑
j
sj(t−)hj(x) − hi(x)

 ν(dx)

 dt
+ si(t−)
(
σidWi(t)−
∑
j
sj(t−)σjdWj(t)
)
+ si(t−)
∫
R
(
1 + hi(x)
1 +
∑
j sj(t−)hj(x)
− 1
)
N˜(dt, dx).
(9)
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Define h(x) =
(
h1(x), h2(x), . . . , hn(x)
)T
and W(t) =
(
W1(t),W2(t), . . . ,Wn(t)
)T
. With a little work, one can
see that
ds(t) = D1
(
s(t−))dt+D2(s(t−))dW(t) + ∫
R
D3(s(t−))N˜(dt, dx), (10)
where
D1
(
y
)
:=
[
diag(y1, . . . , yn)− yyT
][
A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)
]
y
+
∫
R
(
yh(x)T − diag(h1(x), . . . , hn(x))
+
1
1 + yTh(x)
diag(1 + h1(x), . . . , 1 + hn(x))− diag(1, . . . , 1)
)
y ν(dx),
D2
(
y
)
:=
[
diag(y1, . . . , yn)− yyT
]
diag(σ1, . . . , σn),
and
D3
(
y
)
:=
(
1
1 + yTh(x)
diag(1 + h1(x), . . . , 1 + hn(x)) − diag(1, . . . , 1)
)
y.
Denote AJ as the infinitesimal generator for our process defined by Equation (10). By Theorem 2 (Part II
Chapter 2 §6) in Gihman and Skorohod [13], we see that
AJf(y) =
∑
j
D˜1j
(
y
) ∂f
∂yj
(y) +
1
2
∑
j,k
γjk(y)
∂2f
∂yj∂yk
(y)
+
∫
R
(
f
(
D3
(
y
)
+ y
) − f(y))ν(dx),
where Dij is the j
th coordinate of the function Di, γjk(y) :=
∑
l
cjl(y)ckl(y) for cjl(y) :=
{
yj(1− yj)σj , j = l
−yjylσl j 6= l ,
and
D˜1i
(
y
)
:= yi(ei − y)T
[
A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)
]
y +
∫
R
yi
(∑
k
ykhk(x) − hi(x)
)
ν(dx).
A interesting behavior of the stochastic replicator dynamic is that it evolves closely to ek, for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
[17]. Since the only stationary points of the stochastic replicator dynamic are the corner points of the simplex, this is
how we would expect the dynamics to behave. Since the jump functions could potentially enhance this characteristic,
the extended stochastic replicator dynamic should evolve similarly. We show this behavior below. The proof of this
behavior is an extension of the derivation given by Imhof [17]. Since the jump functions are bounded, the result is
fairly natural.
Theorem 4.1. Take s(t) to be an n-dimensional stochastic replicator dynamic defined by Equation (10), an arbitrary
payoff matrix A, and for ǫ > 0, define τǫ := inf
{
t > 0 : sk(t) ≥ 1− ǫ for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
}
. Then for y ∈ ∆n,
Ey[τǫ] <∞,
and
Py
(
sup
t>0
max{s1(t), . . . , sn(t)} = 1
)
= 1.
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Proof. For α > 0 and y ∈ ∆n define the positive function g(y) = neα −
∑
k
eαyk . Define the “new” payoff matrix
A˜ := A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n), and set AJ as the infinitesimal generator. Then
AJg(y) = −α
∑
k
yk(ek − y)T A˜yeαyk − α
2
2
∑
k
y2k
(
σ2k(1 − yk)2 +
∑
j 6=k
σ2j yj
)
eαyk
− α
∫
R
∑
k
yk

∑
j
yjhj(x) − hk(x)

 eαykν(dx)
+
∫
R
[∑
k
exp{αyk} −
∑
k
exp
{
αyk
(
1 + hk(x)
)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
}]
ν(dx).
:= I + II + III,
respectively. We now determine upper bounds for each term. For σmin := min{σ1, . . . , σn} and a constant β > 0
such that
∣∣∣(ek − y)T A˜y∣∣∣ ≤ β for all y ∈ ∆n and all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then one can see that
I = −α
∑
k
yk(ek−y)T A˜yeαyk−α
2
2
∑
k
y2k
(
σ2k(1−yk)2+
∑
j 6=k
σ2j yj
)
eαyk ≤ α
∑
k
yke
αyk
[
β−ασ
2
min
2
yk
(
1−yk
)2]
. (11)
Furthermore, for κmax := sup
x∈R
max{h1(x), . . . , hn(x)}, κmin := inf
x∈R
min{h1(x), . . . , hn(x)}, and M :=
∫
R
(
κmax −
κmin
)
ν(dx), we have the inequality
II = α
∫
R
∑
k
yk

−∑
j
yjhj(x) + hk(x)

 eαykν(dx) ≤ α∑
k
yke
αykM. (12)
Recalling the inequality −ex ≤ −1− x for x > 0, we consider
III =
∫
R
[∑
k
exp{αyk} −
∑
k
exp
{
αyk
(
1 + hk(x)
)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
}]
ν(dx) ≤
∑
k
∫
R
[
exp{αyk} − 1−
αyk
(
1 + hk(x)
)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
]
ν(dx)
=
∑
k
∫
R
[
∞∑
n=0
(αyk)
n
n!
− 1− αyk
(
1 + hk(x)
)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
]
ν(dx) =
∑
k
αyk
∫
R
[
∞∑
n=1
(αyk)
n−1
n!
− 1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
]
ν(dx)
≤
∑
k
αyk
∫
R
[
∞∑
n=1
(αyk)
n−1
n!
]
ν(dx) =
∑
k
αyk exp{αyk}
∫
R
[
exp{−αyk}
∞∑
n=1
(αyk)
n−1
n!
]
ν(dx)
≤ α
∑
k
yk exp{αyk}ν
(
R
)
.
(13)
Collecting Equations (11), (12), and (13), we see that
AJg(y) ≤ α
∑
k
yke
αyk
[(
β +M + ν
(
R
))− ασ2min
2
yk
(
1− yk
)2]
Choose α > 0 large enough that α
σ2min
2
y
(
1− y)2 ≥ (β +M + ν(R))n+ 1, and for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, take
y ∈ ∆n such that yi ≤ 1− ǫ for all i. For our y, there is at least one yk such that yk ≥ 1
n
and hence
AJg(y) ≤ α
(
β +M + ν
(
R
)) ∑
k: yk<1/n
yke
αyk + α
∑
k: yk≥1/n
yke
αyk
(
− (n− 1)
(
β +M + ν
(
R
))− 1)
≤ α
(
β +M + ν
(
R
))
(n− 1)e
α/n
n
+ α
eα/n
n
(
− (n− 1)
(
β +M + ν
(
R
))− 1)
= −αe
α/n
n
.
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Now by Dynkin’s formula for every finite T ,
0 ≤ Ey
[
g
(
s
(
τǫ ∧ T
))]
= g(y) + Ey
[∫ τǫ∧T
0
AJg
(
s(t)
)
dt
]
≤ neα − αe
α/n
n
Ey
[
τǫ ∧ T
]
.
Therefore, by the monotone convergence theorem, letting T →∞ yields the inequality Ey
[
τǫ
] ≤ n2 eα
α
.
Finally, take ǫ = 1/m for m ∈ N. Then Py
(
sup
t>0
max{s1(t), . . . , sn(t)} ≥ 1− 1/m
)
= 1, and therefore
1 = Py
( ∞⋂
m=1
{
sup
t>0
max{s1(t), . . . , sn(t)} ≥ 1− 1/m
})
= Py
(
sup
t>0
max{s1(t), . . . , sn(t)} = 1
)
.
Remark 4.1. Showing that Ey[τǫ] < ∞ only uses that τǫ is a stopping time. Hence, defining τ˜ǫ = max {1, τǫ}, one
can see that τ˜nǫ is a stopping time for all n ∈ N, and hence Ey[τ˜nǫ ] < ∞. Therefore, we are able to conclude that
Ey[τ
n
ǫ ] <∞.
We call a strategy p ∈ ∆n a strict Nash Equilibrium if for q ∈ ∆n such that q 6= p, qTAp < pTAp. We
examine how compensated random jumps and white noise affect the stability of replicator dynamics to strict Nash
Equilibria. Throughout this section, take pure strategy Sk as a strict Nash Equilibria, i.e., akk > ajk for all j 6= k.
Since each jump is able to impact stability, we define the functions ψkmin(x) := min
j 6=k
hj(x), ψ
k
max(x) := max
j 6=k
hj(x), and
ψmax(x) := max
j
hj(x). Furthermore, for the matrix A˜ := A−diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n), define β := max
{
|a˜ji| : 1 ≤ j, i ≤ n
}
.
The results in this section are a generalization of the conditions derived by Imhof’s [17], where the addition of
the jump functions creates situations for stability that were not possible with the stochastic replicator dynamic.
For example, Imhof’s result restrict the initial condition to be in a specified neighborhood of the pure strict Nash
Equilibria, while certain characteristics of the jump functions do not require such a neighborhood. The theorem
below illustrates this result.
Although the Lyapunov analysis given in this section may seem fairly straightforward, a general assumption of
jump functions is a bit too unwieldy. To adjust for this complexity, we assume either all of the jump functions are
either nonnegative or all of the jump functions are nonpositive. We first consider the case when all of the jump
functions are nonnegative, and for the nonnegative characteristic, we define the integrals
Ik1 =
∫
R
(
hk(x) − ψkmin(x)
)2
1 + ψmax(x)
ν(dx)
and
Ik2 =
∫
R
ψkmin(x)
2 + hk(x)−
(
1 + hk(x)
)
ψkmax(x)
1 + ψmax(x)
ν(dx).
Theorem 4.2. Take the payoff matrix A and the process s(t) defined in Equation (10). Assume that for the pure
strategy Sk and the corresponding variance σ
2
k, we have the inequality akk > ajk+σ
2
k for all j 6= k, hi(x) is nonnegative
for all i, and −2β + Ik2 ≥ 0. Furthermore, for α > 0, where α+ ajk < akk − σ2k, assume α+ 2β − Ik1 ≥ 0. Then
Py˜
(
lim
t→∞
s(t) = ek
)
≥ y˜k. (14)
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Proof. Take A˜ defined above. Applying the infinitesimal generator AJ to our Lyapunov function g(y) = 1 − yk, we
have
AJg(y) = −yk(ek − y)T A˜y
+−yk
∫
R

 1 + hk(x)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
+
∑
j
yjhj(x)− hk(x) − 1

 ν(dx)
+
∫
R
(
1−
(
yk
(
1 + hk(x)
)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)
− yk + yk
)
+ 1− yk
)
ν(dx)
= −yk(ek − y)T A˜y
+−yk
∫
R

hk(x)−
∑
j yjhj(x) +
(∑
j yjhj(x)
)2
− hk(x)
∑
j yjhj(x)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)

 ν(dx)
We first consider the term −yk(ek − y)T A˜y. We see that
− yk(ek − y)T A˜y = yk
∑
j 6=k
i6=k
yia˜ijyj − yk
(
1− yk
)∑
i6=k
a˜kiyj + y
2
k
(
− (1 − yk)a˜kk +
∑
i6=k
a˜jkyj
)
≤ ykβ
∑
j 6=k
i6=k
yiyj + ykβ
(
1− yk
)∑
i6=k
yj + y
2
k
(
− (1− yk)a˜kk +
(
a˜kk − α
)∑
i6=k
yj
)
≤ −yk
[
(α+ 2β)yk − 2β
]
g(y).
(15)
Now we shift our attention to the integral term. For y ∈ ∆n, we have 1 +
∑
j
yjhj(x) ≥ 1 + min
j
hj(x) > 0 by
Assumption 2.1. Hence, we may focus on the numerator of the integrand to find an inequality. Using the functions
ψk· defined in the beginning of the section, we determine that
∫
R
[
hk(x) −
∑
j
yjhj(x) +

∑
j
yjhj(x)


2
− hk(x)
∑
j
yjhj(x)
]
ν(dx)
=
∫
R
[
hk(x)− ykhk(x)−
∑
j 6=k
yjhj(x) +

ykhk(x) +∑
j 6=k
yjhj(x)


2
− ykhk(x)2 − hk(x)
∑
j 6=k
yjhj(x)
]
ν(dx)
≥
∫
R
[
hk(x)− ykhk(x)− ψkmax(x)
∑
j 6=k
yj +

ykhk(x) + ψkmin(x)∑
j 6=k
yj


2
− ykhk(x)2 − hk(x)ψkmax(x)
∑
j 6=k
yj
]
ν(dx)
=
∫
R
[
hk(x)− ykhk(x)− ψkmax(x)(1 − yk) +
(
ykhk(x) + ψ
k
min(x)(1 − yk)
)2
− ykhk(x)2 − hk(x)ψkmax(x)(1 − yk)
]
ν(dx)
=
∫
R
[
hk(x)− ykhk(x)− ψkmax(x)(1 − yk) + y2khk(x)2 + 2ykhk(x)ψkmin(x)(1 − yk) + ψkmin(x)2(1− yk)2
− ykhk(x)2 − hk(x)ψkmax(x)(1 − yk)
]
ν(dx)
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=∫
R
[
hk − ψkmax(x) +−ykhk(x)2 + 2ykhk(x)ψkmin(x) + ψkmin(x)2(1− yk)− hk(x)ψkmax(x)
]
ν(dx) · (1− yk)
=
∫
R
[
−
(
hk(x)
2 − 2hk(x)ψkmin(x) + ψkmin(x)2
)
· yk + ψkmin(x)2 + hk(x) −
(
1 + hk(x)
)
ψkmax(x)
]
ν(dx) · (1− yk)
=
[
−
∫
R
(
hk(x)− ψkmin(x)
)2
ν(dx) · yk +
∫
R
(
ψkmin(x)
2 + hk(x) −
(
1 + hk(x)
)
ψkmax(x)
)
ν(dx)
]
g(y).
(16)
Equation (16) tells us that
− yk
∫
R


(∑
j yjhj(x)
)2
− hk(x)
∑
j yjhj(x)
1 +
∑
j yjhj(x)

 ν(dx) ≤ −yk[− Ik1 yk + Ik2 ]g(y). (17)
Equations (15) and (17) yield the inequality
AJg(y) ≤ −yk
[(
α+ 2β − Ik1
)
yk −
(
2β − Ik2
)]
g(y) := gˆ(y).
With our assumptions we have gˆ(y) ≤ 0 for every y ∈ ∆n. For an arbitrary δ > 0, define Vδ =
{
y ∈ ∆n : yk > δ
}
,
and τVδ as the first time the process leaves Vδ. Then g
(
s
(
t ∧ τVδ
))
is a local supermartingale, and thus for y˜ ∈ Vδ,
Py˜
(
sup
0≤t<∞
g
(
s
(
t ∧ τVδ
)) ≥ 1− δ) ≤ g
(
y˜
)
1− δ
which implies
Py˜
(
sup
0≤t<∞
g
(
s
(
t ∧ τVδ
))
< 1− δ
)
≥ 1− g
(
y˜
)
1− δ .
Notice that for ǫ > 0, there is a d > 0 such that gˆ(y) ≤ −d on Vδ\Uǫ(ek). Therefore, applying the logic given in
the proof of Theorem 2 on page 39 in Kushner [20], we conclude that Py˜
(
lim
t→∞
s(t) = ek
)
≥ 1− 1− y˜k
1− δ . Since δ was
arbitrary, letting δ → 0 yields Py˜
(
lim
t→∞
s(t) = ek
)
≥ y˜k.
To display the stoutness of the theorem, suppose that 0 ≤ ψkmax(x), ψmin(x)k < 1 and hk(x) is sufficiently larger
than ψkmax(x). Then we have I
k
2 ≥ 0. If 2β is small enough, −2β + I2k ≥ 0, which tells us that the jump function of
the kth subpopulation fortify the stochastic stability of the Nash equilibrium Sk. Furthermore, if I
k
1 < I
k
2 , it is very
likely that 2β − Ik1 ≥ 0, and so α + 2β − Ik1 ≥ 0. However, if 2β − Ik1 < 0, then α could be large enough so that
α + 2β − Ik1 ≥ 0. In this situation, the strict Nash Equilibrium is strong enough to dictate the trajectories of the
stochastic differential equation. A case like this is possible with σ2k small and min
{|akk−ajk| : 1 ≤ j ≤ n and j 6= k}
relatively large. However, it is more likely that −2β + Ik2 < 0. The corollary below considers this case.
Corollary 4.1. Assume that for the pure strategy Sk and the corresponding variance σ
2
k, we have the inequality
akk > ajk + σ
2
k for all j 6= k , hi(x) is nonnegative for all i, −2β + Ik2 < 0, and for α defined in the theorem above,
α+2β− Ik1 ≥ 0, and Ik1 ≤ Ik2 +α/2. Then for every ǫ > 0, there exists a neighborhood of ek, say U ⊂ ∆n, such that
for any y˜ ∈ U ,
Py˜
(
lim
t→∞
s(t) = ek
)
≥ 1− ǫ.
Proof. From Theorem 5.1, we have the inequality AJg(y) ≤ −yk
[(
α+2β−Ik1
)
yk−
(
2β−Ik2
)]
g(y). Define U0 =
{
y ∈
∆n : yk >
1
2
α+ 4β − 2Ik2
α+ 2β − Ik1
}
. Note that for c :=
α
4
(
1−2 I
k
2
α+ 4β
)
, c > 0 and −yk
[(
α+2β− Ik1
)
yk−
(
2β− Ik2
)]
g(y) ≤
−cg(y) for y ∈ U0. Therefore, by Theorem 4 and Remark 2 in [13] (page 325), we are able to conclude our proof.
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Inspecting the proof of Theorem 5.1, we see that we are able to further expand this result. In particular, we can
create an algorithm for the terms of the form
∑
j 6=k
yjhj(x), and be more liberal with our inequalities. Unfortunately,
this will not tell us much about the dynamic of the process.
For the nonpositive case, define the integrals
Jk1 =
∫
R
(
hk(x)− ψkmax(x)
)2
1 + ψmax(x)
ν(dx)
and
Jk2 =
∫
R
hk(x)
(
1− ψkmin(x)
) − ψkmax(x)(1− ψkmax(x))
1 + ψmax(x)
ν(dx).
Notice that Ik1 andJ
k
1 differ by the terms
(
hk(x) − ψkmin(x)
)2
and
(
hk(x) − ψkmax(x)
)2
, respectively. Since Ik1
is derived for the nonnegative case, and hence none of the subpopulations have a detrimental impact, all of the
subpopulations have to be considered. However, Jk1 is derived for the nonpositive case, and since every subpopulation
is negatively affected, consideration only needs to be given to the subpopulations that are least affected by the
anomaly.
To simplify the statement of the following corollaries and theorems, we define the following assumptions. The
assumptions for the nonnegative case correspond to the previous theorem and corollary.
Assumption 4.1. Take β defined in the beginning of the section. Then:
(a) hi(x) is nonnegative for all i, −2β + Ik2 ≥ 0, there is an α > 0 where α + ajk < akk − σ2k for all j, and
α+ 2β − Ik1 ≥ 0;
(b) hi(x) is nonnegative for all i, −2β+Ik2 < 0, there is an α > 0 where α+ajk < akk−σ2k for all j, α+2β−Ik1 > 0,
and Ik1 ≤ Ik2 + α/2;
(c) hi(x) is nonpositive for all i, −2β + Jk2 ≥ 0, there is an α > 0 where α + ajk < akk − σ2k for all j, and
α+ 2β − Jk1 ≥ 0;
(d) hi(x) is nonpositive for all i, −2β+Jk2 < 0, there is an α > 0 where α+ajk < akk−σ2k for all j, α+2β−Jk1 > 0,
and Jk1 ≤ Jk2 + α/2.
The next two corollaries correspond to the nonpositive jump function case. Since the derivation follows what was
done in the nonnegative case, for brevity, we do not show these proofs.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose that Assumption 5.1(c) holds. Then for the initial condition y˜ ∈ ∆n, we have
Py˜
(
lim
t→∞
s(t) = ek
)
≥ y˜k. (18)
Corollary 4.3. If Assumption 5.1(d) holds, then for every ǫ > 0, there exists a neighborhood of ek, say V ⊂ ∆n,
such that for any y˜ ∈ V ,
Py˜
(
lim
t→∞
s(t) = ek
)
≥ 1− ǫ.
If for every pure strategy Sk and the corresponding variance σ
2
k, we have the inequality akk > ajk + σ
2
j for all
j 6= k, This is called a coordination game. The game is naturally named since if someone is playing Si then you
must play Si, even though Sj might have a greater payoff. As such, from an evolutionary perspective, it is nontrivial
to determine which subpopulations will eventually win, especially since initial condition determines much of the
dynamic. The theorem below shows that if any of the conditions hold in Assumption 5.1 hold for all pure strategies
in a coordination game, then the process will converge to some subpopulation with probability 1. What we are
not currently able to do, given an initial condition, is determine the distribution of the sample paths converging
to each subpopulation.This short coming also holds for the stochastic replicator dynamic. Since Assumption 5.1
(j), for j = a, b, c, d, says that all the jump functions are fairly closely to each other, one would expect the Poisson
perturbation to make a minimal impact on the dynamics. Since the ground work has been done by the previous
theorems and corollaries in this section, the proof follows exactly the one given in Imhof [17].
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Theorem 4.3. Take the matrix A to be the payoff matrix to a coordination, and the process s(t) defined in Equation
(10). If for each pure strategy we have Assumption 5.1(a) or Assumption 5.1(b) holds, then
Py˜
(
lim
t→∞
s(t) = ek for some k
)
= 1.
Proof. For an arbitrary ǫ > 0 take τǫ defined in Theorem 4.1, y ∈ ∆n, define Q =
{
lim
t→∞
sk(t) = ek for some k
}
,
and χQ as the indicator function over this set. Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.1 tells us for every small ǫ > 0, there
exists a neighborhood of ek, say U , where if y˜ ∈ U then Py˜
(
lim
t→∞
s(t) = ek for some k
)
> 1− ǫ. From Theorem 4.2,
we have Ey˜
[
τǫ
]
<∞, and so the strong Markov property tells us that
Py˜
(
Q
)
= Ey˜
[
Es(τǫ)
[
χQ
]] ≥ 1− ǫ.
Since ǫ was arbitrary, the theorem holds.
Corollary 4.4. If for each pure strategy we have Assumption 5.1(c) or Assumption 5.1(d) holds, then
Py˜
(
lim
t→∞
s(t) = ek for some k
)
= 1.
5 Dominated Strategies
We say that a strategy q is dominated by p if for any strategy you play against your better payoff comes from
employing strategy p, i.e., qTAp′ ≤ pTAp′ for all p′ ∈ ∆n. Imhof [17] showed that under suitable conditions, pure
strategies that are dominated eventually become extinct. We show under appropriate Gaussian and compensated
Poissonian perturbations, a dominated pure strategy becomes extinct. The condition for extinction is more general
than the condition derived by Imhof [17]. In particular, there is an extra term added to the inequality given in
Theorem 3.1 (Imhof [17]). This new inequality creates more situations for the dominated subpopulation to become
extinct. For example, if the inequality for extinction does not hold for the stochastic replicator dynamic, the inequality
may hold when considering the affect of anomalies. Since the method employed in Theorem 3.1 [17] is quite natural,
we consider an extension of this derivation. In Imhof’s derivation, a term similar to Law of the Iterated Logarithm
that was added to adjust for the Brownian term. However, in the derivation below, there is no need to include this
term, displaying that it may be more natural to consider anomalies in replicator dynamics.
Theorem 5.1. Let the pure strategy Sk be dominated by the mixed strategy p ∈ ∆n. For our payoff matrix A define
K1 = min
q∈∆n
{
pTAq− eTkAq
}
, K2 = −σ
2
k
2
+
1
2
∑
j
pjσ
2
j , and define σmax = max{σ1, . . . , σn}. Assume for all x ∈ R
log
(
1+ hk(x)
)
<
∑
j
pj log
(
1+ hj(x)
)
. If the inequality
∫
R
(
hk(x)−
∑
j
pjhj(x)
)
ν(dx) + (K1−K2) > 0 holds, then
for every y ∈ ∆n,
Py
(
sk(t) = o
(
exp
{
− t
[ ∫
R
(
hk(x) −
∑
j
pjhj(x)
)
ν(dx) +
(
K1 −K2
)]} ))
= 1.
Proof. For a dominating mixed strategy p, define G(t) = log
(
sk(t)
)−∑
j
pj log
(
sj(t)
)
. Itoˆ’s lemma yields
G(t) =G(0) +
∫ t
0
(
eTkAs(u)− pTAs(u)−
σ2k
2
+
1
2
∑
j
pjσ
2
j
)
du+ t
∫
R
(
− hk(x) +
∑
j
pjhj(x)
)
ν(dx)
+ t
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
ν(dx) + σkWk(t)−
∑
j
pjσjWj(t) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
N˜(dx, du).
(19)
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Notice that the first two terms in the first line of Equation (19) are in the statement of the theorem. To
help with the analysis, we simplify and understand the behavior of the last two terms in the second line. Defining
σ˜ :=
[
(1−pk)2σ2k+
∑
j 6=k
p2jσ
2
j
]1/2
, we see that W˜ (t) :=
[
σkWk(t)−
∑
j
pjσjWj(t)
]
/σ˜ is a standard Wiener process, and
σ˜ ≤ √2σmax. For the integral
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
N˜(dx, du), notice that the integrand is not dependent
on the time variable. Hence
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
N(dx, du) is a compound Poisson process. Since ν
(
R
)
<
∞, Theorem 36.5 in Sato [25] tells us that
lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
N(dx, du) =
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
ν(dx) a.s.
Therefore
lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
N˜(dx, du) = 0 a.s. (20)
.
We are now ready to determine the behavior of the process at the dominated pure strategy. Getting a better
bound on G(t), notice Py almost surely
G(t) ≤ G(0) +
(
K2 −K1
)
t+ t
∫
R
(
− hk(x) +
∑
j
pjhj(x) + log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
))
ν(dx)
+ σ˜W˜ (t) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
N˜(dx, du).
(21)
Note that the assumption on the jump functions gives us log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
< 0, for all x.
To show that sk(t) goes to zero almost surely, we consider
lim sup
t→∞
sk(t) exp
[
t
∫
R
(
hk(x) −
∑
j
pjhj(x)
)
ν(dx) + (K1 −K2)t
]
≤ lim sup
t→∞
exp
[
G(t) + t
∫
R
(
hk(x) −
∑
j
pjhj(x)
)
ν(dx) + (K1 −K2)t
]
≤ lim sup
t→∞
exp
[
G(0) + t
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
ν(dx) +
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
N˜(dx, du) + σ˜W˜ (t)
]
.
(22)
The Law of the Iterated Logarithm tell us that lim sup
t→∞
exp
[
G(0) + σ˜W˜ (t) − 3σmax
√
t log log t
]
= 0 a.s. But,
3σmax
√
t log log t < t
∫
R
− log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
ν(dx), for large enough t. Therefore, considering Equation (20),
we are able to conclude that
lim sup
t→∞
exp
[
G(0)+
∫ t
0
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
N˜(dx, du)+σ˜W˜ (t)+t
∫
R
log
(
1 + hk(x)∏
j
(
1 + hj(x)
)pj
)
ν(dx)
]
= 0. a.s.
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6 Conditions for Recurrence Near an Interior Evolutionary Stable Strat-
egy
Take A to be a payoff matrix for a symmetric game. A strategy p ∈ ∆n is called an evolutionary stable strategy if:
qTAp ≤ pTAp for all q ∈ ∆n; and for q ∈ ∆n where q 6= p and qTAp = pTAp, we have that q · Aq < p · Aq.
Imhof [17] considered an internal evolutionary stable strategy where the payoff matrix is conditional negative definite,
which is defined below. From these assumptions, the author was then able to show conditions for the process to
be positive Harris recurrent, and for the mass of the invariant measure to be in a neighborhood of the evolutionary
stable strategy. We give conditions for Equation (10) to be positive Harris recurrent. The assumptions for the
theorem are similar to Imhof’s, but are more stringent. The complexity that the compensated Poissonian term adds
to the stochastic replicator dynamic could easily override the recurrence of the process in a neighborhood of the
evolutionary stable strategy. Since the process is right-continuous, a different and more tedious method is needed to
show the process is positive Harris recurrent. The author’s results are used to help display that this property holds.
For the purposes of the proof of the theorem below, we take d(y,p) as the Kullback-Leibler distance, i.e.,
d(y,p) =
∑
j
pj log
(
pj/yj
)
, where log
(
pj/yj
)
= 0 if pj = 0 or yj = 0.
Definition 6.1. A matrix A is said to be conditionally negative definite if for y ∈ Rn\{0} where 1Ty = 0, we have
yTAy < 0.
Lemma (Imhof [17]). Suppose that A is an n × n (n ≥ 2) conditionally negative definite matrix, define A =
1
2
(
A+AT
)
and let λ2 be the second largest eigenvalue of
D := A− 1
n
A11T − 1
n
11TA+
1TA1
n
11T .
Then
max
xT 1=0
x 6=0
xTDx
xTx
= max
xT 1=0
x 6=0
xTAx
xTx
= λ2 < 0.
Theorem 6.1. Take s(t) defined in Equation (10), p ∈ ∆n an ESS for our payoff matrix A, λ2 as the second largest
eigenvalue of D, and define
κ2J =
1
2
∑
j
pjσ
2
j −
1
2
∑
j σ
−2
j
+
∫
R
max
k
hk(x)ν(dx)
+
∑
j
pj
∫
R
log
(
1 + maxk hk(x)
1 + hj(x)
)
ν(dx) −
∑
j
pj
∫
R
hj(x)ν(dx).
Assume that 0 < κJ <
n
n− 1
√
|λ2| min
1≤j≤n
pj, A is conditionally negative definite, and that
∫
R
(∑
j
(pj − yj)hj(x) −
1
)
ν(dx) < 0 holds for all y ∈ ∆n. Then for δ > 0 such that δ2 > κ2J/|λ2|, y ∈ ∆n, and t > 0, we have the inequalities
Ey
[
τUδ(p)
] ≤ d(y,p)|λ2|δ2 − κ2J . (23)
and
Ey
[
1
t
∫ t
0
∣∣∣s(u)− p∣∣∣2du] ≤ 1|λ2|
(
d
(
y,p
)
t
+ κ2J
)
. (24)
Lastly, an invariant measure of the stochastic replicator dynamic, which we call π(·), exists, is unique, and satisfies
the inequality
π
(
Uδ(p)
)
≥ 1− κ
2
J
|λ2|δ2 . (25)
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Proof. For p ∈ ∆n an ESS for A, define the function v(y) =
∑
j pj log
(
pj/yj
)
, (hence, v(y) tells us how close y is
to p). Applying AJ (the infinitesimal generator) to v, we see that
AJv(y) = −
∑
j
pi(ei − y)T
[
A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)
]
y +
1
2
∑
j
pj
(
σ2j − 2yjσ2j +
∑
k
y2kσ
2
k
)
−
∑
j
pj
∫
R
(
hj(x)−
∑
k
ykhk(x)
)
ν(dx) +
∑
j
pj
∫
R
log
(
1 +
∑
k ykhk(x)
1 + hj(x)
)
ν(dx)
= (y − p)TAy − 1
2
∑
j
y2jσ
2
j +
1
2
∑
j
pjσ
2
j −
∑
j
pj
∫
R
(
hj(x)−
∑
k
ykhk(x)
)
ν(dx)
+
∑
j
pj
∫
R
log
(
1 +
∑
k ykhk(x)
1 + hj(x)
)
ν(dx)
≤ (y − p)TAy − 1
2
∑
j
y2jσ
2
j +
1
2
∑
j
pjσ
2
j +
∫
R
max
k
hk(x)ν(dx) −
∑
j
pj
∫
R
hj(x)ν(dx)
+
∑
j
pj
∫
R
log
(
1 + maxk hk(x)
1 + hj(x)
)
ν(dx).
Determining an upper bound on AJv(y), we see that (y − p)TAy ≤ (y − p)TA(y − p) ≤ λ2|y − p|2. Moreover,
Cauchy-Schwarz yields 1 ≤
(∑
j
y2jσ
2
j
)∑
j
σ−2j , which gives −
1
2
∑
j
y2jσ
2
j ≤ −
1
2
∑
j σ
−2
j
. Thus, for y ∈ ∆n,
AJv(y) ≤ λ2|y − p|2 + κ2J .
Our assumption δ2 > κ2J/|λ2| tells us for y ∈ ∆n\Uδ(p), AJv(y) ≤ λ2δ2+κ2J . By Itoˆ’s lemma, the process v(s(t))−
(λ2δ
2 + κ2J )t is a local supermartingale on the interval [0, τUδ(p)). Therefore v(y) ≥
(
|λ2|δ2 − κ2J
)
Ey
[
τUδ(p)
]
, which
shows the inequality in Equation (23). The strong Markov property tells us that s(t) is recurrent in the set Uδ(p).
Furthermore, by choosing a δ0 > 0 where κJ/
√
|λ2| < δ0 < n
n− 1 min1≤j≤n pj one can see that ∆n\
{
∆n ∩ Uδ(p)
}
= ∅.
Thus, s(t) never hits the boundary and we are able to choose any δ > 0 for which the inequality holds.
Now define τk = inf{t > 0 : v
(
s(t)
) ≥ k}, where k > v(y). Applying Dynkin’s formula we see that
0 ≤ Ey
[
v(s
(
t ∧ τk
)]
= v(y) + Ey
[∫ t∧τk
0
AJv
(
s(u)
)
du
]
≤ v(y) + λ2Ey
[∫ t∧τk
0
|s(u)− p|2du
]
+ κ2JEy
[
t ∧ τk
]
Since t ∧ τk → t as k →∞, the bounded convergence theorem yields Equation (24).
To show Equation (25) we need to show that the transition probabilities converge in total variation to an invariant
measure (which makes this measure unique). To accomplish this task we will apply Theorem 5.2 in Down et al [10]. In
order to satisfy the hypotheses of the theorem, we need to show that our process is ψ-irreducible (page 1674 [10]) and
aperdiodic (page 1675 [10]). To show the ψ-irreducible condition, we define the Borel measure ψ(O) = M
(
O∩Uδ(p)
)
,
where M is the Lebesgue measure, and ηO :=
∫ ∞
0
1{s(t)∈O}dt, which is the occupancy time. Since we know our
process is recurrent in Uδ(p) , if ψ(O) > 0 then Ey[ηO] > 0.
To show the aperiodic condition we need to find a small Borel set B and a time T such that Py(t, B) > 0 for
all t ≥ T and all y ∈ B. A clear candidate for B is the set Uδ(p). Before we show this conditions holds, we note
that since the Poisson measure is generated by a Le´vy process, (and so the initial condition for Le´vy process is Dirac
measure δ0), and independent of all the Wiener processes, the jumps are only dependent on time.
To show this condition holds, we follow the proof of Claim 1 given in [21]. Since ν
(
R
)
<∞, we may rewrite s(t)
as
s(t) = y +
∫ t
0
Dˆ1
(
s(t−))dt+ ∫ t
0
D2
(
s(t−))dW(t) + ∫ t
0
∫
R
D3(s(t−))N(dt, dx),
where
Dˆ1
(
y
)
=
[
diag(y1, . . . , yn)− yyT
][
A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)
]
y +
∫
R
(
yh(x)T − diag(h1(x), . . . , hn(x)
)
ν(dx).
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For the finite interval [0, t′], there is a positive probability Py that a jump does not occur. On this event, s(t) agrees
with the process
l(t) = y +
∫ t
0
Dˆ1
(
l(t)
)
dt+
∫ t
0
D2
(
l(t)
)
dW(t).
Thus, considering Theorem 2.1 in Imhof [17], the condition holds.
Lastly, we need to show for a function V ∈ D(AJ ), where V ≥ 1, there are constants c, b > 0 such that
AJV (·) ≤ −cV (·) + b1Uδ(p)(·). Define V (y) = K +
∏
l
y−pll , where K is a positive constant which will later be
determined. So
AJV (y) = −
∑
i
pi

(ei − y)T
[
A− diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2n)
]
y +
∫
R
(∑
j
yjhj(x)− hi(x)
)
ν(dx)

∏
l
y−pll
+
1
2
∑
i
pi(pi + 1)

(1− 2yi)σ2i +∑
j
y2jσ
2
j

∏
l
y−pll +
1
2
∑
i
∑
i6=k
pipk

∑
j
y2jσ
2
j − yiσ2i − ykσ2k

∏
l
y−pll
+
∫
R
(
V
(
D3(y) + y
)
− V (y))ν(dx)
= (y − p)TAy ·
∏
l
y−pll +
∫
R
∑
j
(pj − yj)hj(x)ν(dx) ·
∏
l
y−pll +
∑
j
yj(pj − yj)σ2j ·
∏
l
y−pll
+
∑
i
pi
[
(1 − 2yi)σ2i +
∑
j
y2jσ
2
j
]∏
l
y−pll −
1
2
∑
i
pi
∑
k 6=i
pk
[
(1− 2yi)σ2i +
∑
j
y2jσ
2
j
]∏
l
y−pll
+
1
2
∑
i
∑
i6=k
pipk
[∑
j
y2jσ
2
j − yiσ2i − ykσ2k
]∏
l
y−pll +
∫
R
(
V
(
D3(y) + y
)
− V (y))ν(dx)
= (y − p)TAy ·
∏
l
y−pll +
∫
R
∑
j
(pj − yj)hj(x)ν(dx) ·
∏
l
y−pll +
∑
j
pi(1 − yj)σ2j ·
∏
l
y−pll
− 1
2
∑
i
∑
k 6=i
pipk
[
(1 − yi)σ2i + ykσ2k
]∏
l
y−pll +
∫
R
(
V
(
D3(y) + y
)
− V (y))ν(dx)
≤
(
λ2|p− y|2 +
∑
j
pi(1− yj)σ2j +
∫
R
(∑
j
(pj − yj)hj(x)− 1
)
ν(dx)
− 1
2
∑
i
∑
k 6=i
pipk
[
(1 − yi)σ2i + ykσ2k
])∏
l
y−pll +
∫
R
1 + maxj hj(x)
1 + minj hj(x)
ν(dx)
:= C(y)
∏
l
y−pll + ς,
for
C(y) := λ2|p− y|2 +
∑
j
pi(1− yj)σ2j +
∫
R
(∑
j
(pj − yj)hj(x) − 1
)
ν(dx) − 1
2
∑
i
∑
k 6=i
pipk
[
(1 − yi)σ2i + ykσ2k
]
and
ς =
∫
R
1 + maxj hj(x)
1 + minj hj(x)
ν(dx).
To finish the inequality, we note that
C(y)
∏
l
y−pll + ς =
(
C(y)
∏
l y
−pl
l
V (y)
+
ς
V (y)
)
V (y) =
(
C(y)
∏
l y
−pl
l
K +
∏
l y
−pl
l
+
ς
K +
∏
l y
−pl
l
)
V (y) ≤
(
C(y) +
ς
K
)
V
(
y
)
.
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By our assumptions, C(y) < 0 for y ∈ ∆n\Uδ(p). Thus, taking K large enough so that C(y) + ςK < 0 for all
y ∈ ∆n\Uδ(p) and V ≥ 1, we are able to find a constants c, b > 0 such that AJV (y) ≤ −cV (y) + b1Uδ(p)(y) holds
for all y ∈ ∆n.
Defining OC := ∆n\O and π(·) as the invariant measure, we have
π
(
Uδ(p)
C
)
= lim
t→∞
Ey
[
1
t
∫ t
0
1Uδ(p)C
(
s(u)
)
du
]
≤ lim
t→∞
Ey
[
1
t
∫ t
0
|s(u)− p|2
δ2
du
]
≤ κ
2
J
|λ2|δ2 ,
and therefore Equation (25) follows.
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